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Abstract
A central problem in differentially private data analysis is how to design efficient algorithms
capable of answering large numbers of counting queries on a sensitive database. Counting
queries are of the form “What fraction of individual records in the database satisfy the property
q?” We prove that if one-way functions exist, then there is no algorithm that takes as input a
database D ∈ ({0, 1}d)n, and k = Θ˜(n2) arbitrary efficiently computable counting queries, runs
in time poly(d, n), and returns an approximate answer to each query, while satisfying differential
privacy. We also consider the complexity of answering “simple” counting queries, and make some
progress in this direction by showing that the above result holds even when we require that the
queries are computable by constant-depth (AC0) circuits.
Our result is almost tight because it is known that Ω˜(n2) counting queries can be answered
efficiently while satisfying differential privacy. Moreover, many more than n2 queries (even
exponential in n) can be answered in exponential time.
We prove our results by extending the connection between differentially private query release
and cryptographic traitor-tracing schemes to the setting where the queries are given to the
sanitizer as input, and by constructing a traitor-tracing scheme that is secure in this setting.
1 Introduction
Consider a database D ∈ ({0, 1}d)n, in which each of the n rows corresponds to an individual’s
record, and each record consists of d binary attributes. The goal of privacy-preserving data analysis
is to enable rich statistical analyses on the database while protecting the privacy of the individu-
als. It is especially desirable to achieve differential privacy [DMNS06], which guarantees that no
individual’s data has a significant influence on the information released about the database.
Some of the most basic statistics on a database are counting queries, which are queries of the
form, “What fraction of individual records in D satisfy some property q?” In particular we would
like to construct differentially private sanitizers that, given a database D and k counting queries
q1, . . . , qk from a family Q, outputs an approximate answer to each of the queries. We would like
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the number of queries, k, to be as large as possible, and the set of feasible queries, Q, to be as
general as possible. Ideally, Q, would contain all counting queries.1 Moreover, we would like the
algorithm to run as efficiently as possible.
Some of the earliest work in differential privacy [DMNS06] gave an efficient sanitizer—the
so-called Laplace Mechanism. The Laplace Mechanism answers any set of k arbitrary efficiently
computable counting queries by perturbing the answers with appropriately calibrated random noise,
providing good accuracy (say, within ±.01 of the true answer) as long as k . n2.
The ability to approximately answer n2 counting queries is quite powerful, especially in settings
where data is abundant and n is large. However, being limited to n2 queries can be restrictive
in settings where data is expensive or otherwise difficult to acquire, and n is small. It can also
be restrictive when the budget of queries is shared between multiple analysts. Fortunately, a
remarkable result of Blum et al. [BLR08] (with subsequent developments in [DNR+09, DRV10,
RR10, HR10, GRU12, HLM12]), showed that differentially private algorithms are not limited to
n2 queries. They showed how to approximately answer arbitrary counting queries even when k is
exponentially larger than n. Unfortunately, their algorithm, and all subsequent algorithms capable
of answering more than n2 arbitrary counting queries, run in time (at least) poly(2d, n, k).
The result of Blum et al., raises the exciting possibility of an efficient algorithm that can pri-
vately compute approximate answers to large numbers of counting queries. Unfortunately, Dwork
et al. [DNR+09] gave evidence that efficient sanitizers are inherently less powerful than their com-
putationally unbounded counterparts. They study the problem of construcing differentially private
one-shot sanitizers that, given a database D, produce a summary from which approximate an-
swers to every query in Q can be computed, while both the sanitizer and the summary run in time
much less than the size of Q. Dwork et al. constructed a family of 2O˜(
√
n) queries for which there
is no efficient (time poly(d, n)) one-shot sanitizer (under certain cryptographic assumptions), even
though there is an inefficient (time poly(2d, n, |Q|)) one-shot sanitizer even if |Q| is nearly 2n. For
any family Q, constructing an efficient one-shot sanitizer is one way of constructing an efficient
sanitizer that answers any polynomial number of queries from Q. Thus, hardness results for one-
shot sanitizers rule out a particular way of constructing efficient sanitizers. However, ultimately
a polynomial-time analyst will only be able to ask a polynomial number of queries, and hardness
results for one-shot sanitzers still leave hope that there might be an efficient sanitizer that can
answer many more arbitrary counting queries than the Laplace Mechanism.
Unfortunately, we show that this is not the case—there is no efficient, differentially private al-
gorithm that takes a database D ∈ ({0, 1}d)n, and Θ˜(n2) arbitrary, efficiently computable counting
queries as input and outputs an approximate answer to each of the queries. One way to summarize
our results is that, unless we restrict the set Q of allowable queries, or allow exponential running
time, then the Laplace Mechanism is essentially the best possible algorithm for answering counting
queries with differential privacy.
1.1 Our Results and Techniques
As discussed above, in this paper we give new hardness results for answering counting queries while
satisfying differential privacy. To make the statement of our results more concrete, we will assume
that the counting queries are given to the sanitizer as input in the form of circuits that, on input
1It may require super-polynomial time just to evaluate an arbitrary counting query, which would rule out efficiency
for reasons that have nothing to do with privacy. For this discussion, we restrict attention to queries that are efficiently
computable, so are not the bottleneck in the computation.
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an individual record x ∈ {0, 1}d, decide whether or not the record x satisfies the property q. We
say the queries are efficiently computable if the corresponding circuits are of size poly(d, n).
Theorem 1.1. Assuming the existence of one-way functions, there exists a k = n2+o(1) such that
there is no algorithm that, on input a database D ∈ ({0, 1}d)n and k efficiently computable counting
queries, runs in time poly(d, n) and returns an approximate answer to each query to within ±.49,
while satisfying differential privacy.
In particular, Theorem 1.1 applies to interactive sanitizers, which are sanitizers that receive
(possibly adaptively chosen) queries one at a time. Many positive results achieve this stronger
notion of sanitization. In particular, the Laplace mechanism is an efficient interactive sanitizer that
answers Ω˜(n2) queries and there exist interactive sanitizers that can answer nearly 2n queries in
time poly(2d, n) per query interactively [RR10, HR10, GRU12].
We also show that, the same theorem holds even for queries that are computable by unbounded-
fan-in circuits of depth 6 over the basis {∧,∨,¬} (a subset of the well-studied class AC0), albeit
under a stronger (but still plausible) cryptographic assumption.
Theorem 1.2. Under the assumptions described in Section 5.6, there exists a k = n2+o(1) such
that there is no algorithm that, on input a database D ∈ ({0, 1}d)n and k efficiently computable
depth-6 queries (circuits), runs in time poly(d, n) and returns an approximate answer to each query
to within ±.49, while satisfying differential privacy.
Theorem 1.2 should be contrasted with the results of Hardt, Rothblum, and Servedio [HRS12]
as well as Thaler, Ullman, and Vadhan [TUV12], which give efficient sanitizers for answering
nΩ(
√
k)  n2 monotone k-way conjunction queries, a much simpler class than polynomial-size
depth-6 circuits.2
We now describe our techniques.
The Connection with Traitor-Tracing We prove our results by building on the connection be-
tween differentially private sanitizers for counting queries and traitor-tracing schemes discovered by
Dwork et al. [DNR+09]. Traitor-tracing schemes were introduced by Chor, Fiat, and Naor [CFN94]
for the purpose of identifying pirates who violate copyright restrictions. Roughly speaking, a (fully
collusion-resilient) traitor-tracing scheme allows a sender to generate keys for n users so that 1) the
sender can broadcast encrypted messages that can be decrypted by any user, and 2) any efficient
pirate decoder capable of decrypting messages can be traced to at least one of the users who con-
tributed a key to it, even if an arbitrary coalition of the users combined their keys in an arbitrary
efficient manner to construct the decoder.
Dwork et al. show that the existence of traitor-tracing schemes implies hardness results for
one-shot sanitizers. Very informally, they argue as follows: Suppose a coalition of users takes their
keys and builds a database D ∈ ({0, 1}d)n where each record contains one of their user keys. The
family Q will contain a query qc for each possible ciphertext c. The query qc asks “What fraction
of the records (user keys) in D would decrypt the ciphertext c to the message 1?” Every user can
decrypt, so if the sender encrypts a message m ∈ {0, 1} as a ciphertext c, then every user will
decrypt c to m. Thus the answer to the counting query, qc, will be m.
2A monotone k-way conjunction query on a database D ∈ ({0, 1}d)∗ is specified by a set of positions S ⊆ [d],
|S| = k ≤ d, and asks “What fraction of records in D have a 1 in every position in S?”.
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Suppose there were an efficient one-shot sanitizer for Q. Then the coalition could use it to
efficiently produce a summary of the database D that enables one to efficiently compute an ap-
proximate answer to every query qc, which would also allow one to efficiently decrypt the ciphertext.
Such a summary can be viewed as an efficient pirate decoder, and thus the tracing algorithm can
use the summary to trace one of the users in the coalition. However, if there is a way to identify
one of the users in the database from the summary, then the summary is not differentially private.
In order to instantiate their result, they need a traitor-tracing scheme. Since Q contains a
query for every ciphertext, the parameter to optimize is the length of the ciphertexts. Using the
fully collusion-resilient traitor-tracing scheme of Boneh, Sahai, and Waters [BSW06], which has
ciphertexts of length O˜(
√
n), they obtain a family of queries of size 2O˜(
√
n) for which there is no
efficient one-shot sanitizer. Dwork et al. also discovered a partial converse—proving hardness of
one-shot sanitization for a smaller family of queries requires constructing traitor-tracing schemes
with shorter ciphertexts, which is a seemingly difficult open problem.
Our Approach In our setting of sanitization (rather than one-shot sanitization, as studied by
Dwork et al. [DNR+09]), we don’t expect to answer every query in Q, only a much smaller set
of queries requested by the analyst. At first glance, this should make answering the queries much
easier, and thus make it more difficult to demonstrate hardness. However, the attacker does have the
power to choose the queries which he wants answered, and can choose queries that are most difficult
to sanitize. Our first observation is that in the traitor-tracing scenario, the tracing algorithms only
query the pirate decoder on a polynomial number of ciphertexts, which are randomly chosen and
depend on the particular keys that were instantiated for the scheme. For many schemes, even
O˜(n2) queries is sufficient. Thus it would seem that the tracing algorithm could simply decide
which queries it will make, give those queries as input to the sanitizer, and then use the answers
to those queries to identify a user and violate differential privacy.
However, this intuition ignores an important issue. Many traitor-tracing schemes (includ-
ing [BSW06]) can only trace stateless pirate decoders, which essentially commit to a response
to each possible query (or a distribution over responses) once and for all. For one-shot sanitizers,
the private summary is necessarily stateless, and thus the result of Dwork et al. can be instantiated
with any scheme that allows tracing of stateless pirate decoders. However, an arbitrary sanitizer
might give answers that depend on the sequence of queries. Thus, in order to prove our results, we
will need a traitor-tracing scheme that can trace stateful pirate decoders.
The problem of tracing stateful pirates is quite natural even without the implications for private
data analysis. Indeed, this problem has been studied in the literature, originally by Kiayias and
Yung [KY01]. They considered pirates that can abort and record history. However, their solution,
and all others known, does not apply to our specific setting due to a certain “watermarking assump-
tion” that doesn’t apply when proving hardness-of-sanitization (see discussion below). To address
this problem, we also refine the basic connection between traitor-tracing schemes and differential
privacy by showing that, in many respects, fairly weak traitor-tracing schemes suffice to establish
the hardness of preserving privacy. In particular, although the pirate decoder obtained from a san-
itizer may be stateful and record history, the accuracy requirement of the sanitizer means that the
corresponding pirate decoder cannot abort, which will make it easier to construct a traitor-tracing
scheme for these kinds of pirates. Indeed, we construct such a scheme to establish Theorem 1.1.
The scheme also has weakened requirements in other respects, having nothing to do with the
statefulness of the pirate or the tracing algorithm. These weakened requirements allow us to reduce
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the complexity of the decryption, which means that the queries used by the attacker do not need to
be arbitrary polynomial-size circuits, but instead can be circuits of constant depth, which allows us
to establish Theorem 1.2. Another technical issue arises in that all k queries must be given to the
sanitizer at once, whereas tracing algorithms typically are allowed to query the pirate interactively.
However, we are able to show that the scheme we construct can be traced using one round of
queries. See Sections 3.1 and 4 for a precise statement of the kind of traitor-tracing scheme that
suffices and Section 5 for our construction.
Our construction is based on a well-known fully collusion resilient traitor-tracing scheme [CFN94],
but with a modified tracing algorithm. The tracing algorithm uses fingerprinting codes [BS98,
Tar08], which have been employed before in the context of traitor-tracing and content distribu-
tion, but our tracing algorithm is different from all those we are aware of. The resulting scheme
allows for tracing with a minimal number of non-adaptively chosen queries, achieves tracing with-
out context-specific watermarking assumptions, simplifies the decryption circuit (at the expense of
weakening the security parameters and functionality). The restriction to non-aborting pirates may
not be so natural in the setting of content distribution, which may explain why the scheme was not
previously known.
1.2 Related Work
In addition to the hardness results for one-shot sanitizations [DNR+09], which apply to arbitrary
one-shot sanitizers, there are several hardness-of-sanitization results for restricted classes of sani-
tizers. Dwork et al. proved stronger hardness results for sanitizers whose output is a “synthetic
database”—roughly, a new database (of the same dimensions) that approximately preserves the
answer to some set of queries. Their results were extended by Ullman and Vadhan [UV11], who
showed that it is hard to generate a private synthetic database that is accurate for essentially any
non-trivial family of queries, even 2-literal conjunctions.
Gupta et al. [GHRU11] considered algorithms that can only access the database by making a
polynomial number of “statistical queries” (essentially counting queries). They showed that such
algorithms cannot be a one-shot sanitizer (even ignoring privacy constraints) that approximately
answers certain simple families of counting queries with high accuracy.
Finally, Dwork, Naor, and Vadhan [DNV12] gave information-theoretic lower bounds for state-
less sanitizers, which take k queries as input, but whose answers to each query do not depend
on the other k − 1 input queries. They showed that (even computationally unbounded) stateless
sanitizers can answer at most O˜(n2) queries with non-trivial accuracy, while satisfying differential
privacy. The Laplace Mechanism is a stateless sanitizer that answers Ω˜(n2) queries, and thus their
result is tight in this respect. Although their result is information theoretic, and considers a highly
restricted type of sanitizer, their techniques are related to ours. We elaborate on this connection
in the appendix.
2 Preliminaries
Differentially Private Algorithms Let a database D ∈ ({0, 1}d)n be a collection of n rows
(x(1), . . . , x(n)) ∈ {0, 1}d. We say that two databases D,D′ ∈ ({0, 1}d)n are adjacent if they differ
only on a single row, and we denote this by D ∼ D′.
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Definition 2.1 (Differential Privacy [DMNS06]). Let M : ({0, 1}d)n → R be a randomized al-
gorithm that takes a database as input (where n and d are varying parameters). M is (ε, δ)-
differentially private if for every two adjacent databases D ∼ D′ and every subset S ⊆ R,
Pr [M(D) ∈ S] ≤ eεPr [M(D′) ∈ S]+ δ.
If M is (ε, δ)-differentially private for some functions ε = ε(n) = O(1), δ = δ(n) = o(1/n), we will
drop the parameters ε and δ and say that M is differentially private.
The choice of ε = O(1), δ = o(1/n) is a fairly weak setting of the privacy parameters, and
most known constructions of differentially private mechanisms for various tasks give quantita-
tively stronger privacy guarantees. These parameters are essentially the weakest possible, as (ε, δ)-
differentially privacy is not a satisfactory privacy guarantee for ε = ω(1) or δ = Ω(1/n). That our
lower bounds apply to the parameters specified in Definition 2.1 makes our results stronger.
Sanitizers for Counting Queries Since an algorithm that always outputs ⊥ satisfies Defini-
tion 2.1, we also need to specify what it means for the sanitizer to be useful. In this paper we study
sanitizers that give accurate answers to counting queries. A counting query on {0, 1}d is defined
by a predicate q : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}. Abusing notation, we define the evaluation of the query q on a
database D = (x(1), . . . , x(n)) ∈ ({0, 1}d)n to be
q(D) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
q(x(i))
We will use Q(d) to denote a set of counting queries on {0, 1}d and Q = ⋃d∈NQ(d).
We are interested in sanitizers that take a sequence of queries from some set Q as input.
Formally a sanitizer is a function M : ({0, 1}d)n × (Q(d))k → Rk (where, again, n, d, and k are
varying parameters). Notice that we assume that M outputs k real-valued answers. Think of
the j-th component of the output of M as an answer to the j-th query. For the results in this
paper, this assumption will be without loss of generality.3 Definition 2.1 extends naturally to
sanitizers by requiring that for every q1, . . . , qk ∈ Q, the sanitizer Mq1,...,qk(·) =M(·, q1, . . . , qk) is
(ε, δ)-differentially private as a function of the input database.
Now we formally define what it means for a sanitizer to give accurate answers.
Definition 2.2 (Accuracy). Let D be a database and q1, . . . , qk be a set of counting queries. A
sequence of answers a1, . . . , ak is α-accurate for q1, . . . , qk on D if
∀j ∈ [k], |qj(D)− aj | ≤ α.
3In certain settings,M(D, q1, . . . , qk) is allowed to output a “summary” z ∈ R for some range R. In this case, we
would also require that there exists an “evaluator” E : R × Q → R that takes a summary and a query and returns
an answer E(z, q) = a that approximates q(D). The extra generality is used to allow M to run in less time than
the number of queries it is answering (e.g. releasing a fixed family of queries), but this is not relevant for our range
of parameters where k = O˜(n2). Indeed, a generic sanitizer, M that outputs a summary in R can be converted
to a generic sanitizer with output in Rk simply by running M(D, q1, . . . , qk) to obtain z ∈ R and then computing
a1 = E(z, q1), . . . , ak = E(z, qk). This conversion increases the running time by a factor of k, which is the minimum
time required to read the input queries.
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Let Q be a set of counting queries, k ∈ N and α, β ∈ [0, 1] be parameters. A sanitizer M is
(α, β,Q, k)-accurate if for every database D ∈ ({0, 1}d)n and every sequence of queries q1, . . . , qk ∈
Q(d)
Pr
M’s coins
[M(D, q1, . . . , qk) is α-accurate for D and q1, . . . , qk] ≥ 1− β.
If M is (α, β,Q, k)-accurate for any (constant) α < 1/2 and β = β(n) = o(1/n2), we will drop α
and β and say that M is (Q, k)-accurate.
The choice of α < 1/2, β = o(1/n2) is also significantly weaker than what can be achieved by
known constructions of sanitizers. These parameters are also essentially the weakest parameters
possible, as a mechanism that answers 1/2 to every query achieves α = 1/2, β = 0 for any number
of arbitrary queries. Also, if there is a mechanism that achieves (α, β,Q, k)-accuracy for β < 1/2,
then there is another mechanism that achieves (α, o(1/n2),Q, k)-accuracy with only an O(log n)
loss in the privacy parameters and the efficiency of the mechanism.4 That our lower bound applies
to the parameters specified in Definition 2.2 makes our results stronger.
Efficiency of Sanitizers Simply, a sanitizer is efficient if it runs in time polynomial in the length
of its input. To make the statement more precise, we need to specify how the queries are given to
the sanitizer as input.
Notice that to specify an arbitrary counting query q : {0, 1}d → {0, 1} requires 2d bits. In this
case, a sanitizer whose running time is polynomial in the time required to specify the query is not
especially efficient. Thus, we restrict attention to queries that are efficiently computable, and have
a succinct representation. In this work, we will fix the representation to be Boolean circuits over the
basis {∧,∨,¬} with possibly unbounded-fan-in. In this representation, any query can be evaluated
in time |q|, where | · | denotes the size of the circuit computing q. We also want to consider the case
where the queries are computable by circuits of low depth. For a constant h ∈ N, we use Q(d)depth−h
to denote the set of all counting queries on {0, 1}d specified by circuits of depth h. Finally, we use
Q(d)all to denote the set of all counting queries on {0, 1}d.
Definition 2.3 (Efficient Sanitizers). A sanitizer M is efficient if, on input a database D ∈
({0, 1}d)n and k queries q1, . . . , qk ∈ Q(d)all , M runs in time poly(d, n, k, |q1|+ · · ·+ |qk|). For every
h ∈ N, a sanitizer M is efficient for depth-h queries if, on input a database D ∈ ({0, 1}d)n and k
queries q1, . . . , qk ∈ Q(d)depth−h, M runs in time poly(d, n, k, |q1|+ · · ·+ |qk|).
For comparison with our results, we will recall the properties of some known mechanisms, stated
in our terminology and for our choice of parameters:
Theorem 2.4 (Laplace Mechanism [DN03, BDMN05, DMNS06]). There exists a sanitizer MLap
that is 1) differentially private, 2) efficient, and 3) (Q(d)all , Ω˜(n2))-accurate.
Theorem 2.5 (“Advanced Query Release Mechanisms” [BLR08, DNR+09, DRV10, HR10, GRU12,
HLM12]). There exists a sanitizer MAdv that is 1) differentially private and 2) (Q(d)all , 2Ω˜(n/
√
d))-
accurate. For queries q1, . . . , qk ∈ Q(d)all , MAdv runs in time poly(2d, n, k, |q1|+ · · ·+ |qk|).
4Given a sanitizerM that answers every query accurately with probability 1/2+Ω(1), one can obtain a mechanism
M′ that answers every query accurately with probability 1−β. M′ will runM independently r = O(log(1/β)) times
and answers each query with the median of the r answers for that query.
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As we mentioned above, these mechanisms can achieve stronger quantitative privacy and accu-
racy guarantees (in terms of ε, δ for privacy and α, β for accuracy) with only a small degradation
in the number of queries. Also, notice that both of these mechanisms provide accuracy guarantees
that are independent of the complexity of the queries (although the running time of the mechanism
will depend on the complexity of the queries). Our hardness results will apply to sanitizers that
only provide accuracy for queries of size poly(d, n).
3 Traitor-Tracing Schemes
In this section we give define a traitor-tracing scheme. Throughout, we will use ATT to denote
algorithms associated with traitor-tracing schemes.
3.1 Traitor-Tracing Schemes
We now give a definition of a traitor-tracing scheme, heavily tailored to the task of proving hardness
results for generic sanitizers. We will sacrifice some consistency with the standard definitions. See
below for further discussion of the ways in which our definition departs from the standard definition
of traitor-tracing. In some cases, the non-standard aspects of the definition will be necessary to
establish our results, and in others it will be for convenience. Despite these differences, we will
henceforth refer to schemes satisfying our definition simply as traitor-tracing schemes.
Intuitively, a traitor-tracing scheme is a form of broadcast encryption, in which a sender can
broadcast an encrypted message that can be decrypted by each of a large set of users. The standard
notion of security for such a scheme would require that an adversary that doesn’t have any of the
keys cannot decrypt the message. A traitor-tracing scheme has the additional property that given
any decoder capable of decrypting the message (which must in a very loose sense “know” at least
one of the keys), there is a procedure for determining which user’s key is being used. Moreover, we
want the scheme to be “collusion resilient,” in that even if a coalition of users gets together and
combines their keys in some way to produce a decoder, there is still a procedure that identifies at
least one member of the coalition.
We now describe the syntax of a traitor-tracing scheme more formally. For functions n, kTT : N→
N, an (n, kTT)-traitor-tracing scheme is a tuple of algorithms (GenTT,EncTT,DecTT,TraceTT). The
parameter n specifies the number of users of the scheme and the parameter kTT will specify the num-
ber of queries that the tracing algorithm makes to the pirate decoder. We allow all the algorithms
to be randomized except for DecTT.
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• The algorithm GenTT takes a security parameter, κ, and returns a sequence of n = n(κ) user
keys ~sk = (sk(1), . . . , sk(n)) ∈ {0, 1}κ. Formally, ~sk = (sk(1), . . . , sk(n))←R GenTT(1κ).
• The algorithm EncTT takes a sequence of n user keys ~sk and a message bit b ∈ {0, 1}, and
generates a ciphertext c ∈ C = C(κ). Formally, c←R EncTT( ~sk, b).
• The algorithm DecTT takes any single user key sk and a ciphertext c ∈ C, runs in time
poly(κ, n(κ)) and deterministically returns a message bit b̂ ∈ {0, 1}. Formally b̂ = DecTT(sk, c).
5It would not substantially affect our results if DecTT were randomized, but we will assume that DecTT is deter-
ministic for ease of presentation.
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• The algorithm TraceTT takes as input a set of user keys ~sk ∈ ({0, 1}κ)n(κ) and an oracle
P : (C(κ))kTT(κ) → {0, 1}kTT(κ), makes one kTT-tuple of queries, (c1, . . . , ckTT) ∈ C(κ) to its
oracle (kTT = kTT(κ)), and returns the name of a user i ∈ [n(κ)]. Formally, i←R TracePTT( ~sk).
Intuitively, think of the oracle P as being given some subset of keys ~skS = (sk(i))i∈S for a
non-empty set S ⊆ [n], and TraceTT is attempting to identify a user i ∈ S. Clearly, if P ignores its
input and always returns 0, TraceTT cannot have any hope of success, so we must assume that P
is capable of decrypting ciphertexts.
Definition 3.1 (Available Pirate Decoder). Let the tuple of algorithms
ΠTT = (GenTT,EncTT,DecTT,TraceTT) be an (n, kTT)-traitor-tracing scheme. Let P be a (pos-
sibly randomized) algorithm. We say that P is a kTT-available pirate decoder if for every κ ∈ N,
every set of user keys ~sk = (sk(1), . . . , sk(n)) ∈ {0, 1}κ, every S ⊆ [n] such that |S| ≥ n − 1, and
every c1, . . . , ckTT ∈ C(κ),
Pr
 (̂b1, . . . , b̂kTT)←R P( ~skS , c1, . . . , ckTT)
∃j ∈ [kTT], b ∈ {0, 1}
((∀i ∈ S,DecTT(sk(i), cj) = b) ∧ (b̂j 6= b))
 ≤ o( 1
n(κ)2
)
.
In other words, if every user key sk(i) (for i ∈ S) decrypts c to 1 (resp. 0), then P( ~skS , ·) decrypts
c to 1 (resp. 0), with high probability.
We can now define a secure, (n, kTT)-traitor-tracing scheme:
Definition 3.2 (Traitor-Tracing Scheme). Let the tuple of algorithms
ΠTT = (GenTT,EncTT,DecTT,TraceTT) be an (n, kTT)-traitor-tracing scheme. Let kTT : N → N be
a function. We say that ΠTT is a secure (n, kTT)-traitor-tracing scheme if for every S ⊆ [n(κ)]
such that |S| ≥ n(κ) − 1, for every (possibly randomized) algorithm P that 1) runs in time
poly(κ, n(κ), kTT(κ)) and 2) is a kTT-available pirate decoder, we have
Pr
~sk←RGenTT(1κ)
P’s, TraceTT’s coins
[
Trace
P( ~skS ,·)
TT (
~sk) 6∈ S
]
= o
(
1
n(κ)
)
Remarks About Our Definition of Traitor-Tracing The traitor-tracing schemes we consider
are somewhat different than those previously studied in the literature.
• We do not require the encryption or tracing algorithms to use public keys. In the typical ap-
plication of traitor-tracing schemes to content distribution, these would be desirable features,
however they are not necessary for proving hardness of sanitization.
• We only require that the tracing algorithm succeeds with probability 1 − o(1/n). Typically
one would require that the tracing algorithm succeeds with probability 1− n−ω(1).
• We do not give the pirate decoder access to an encryption oracle. In other words, we do not
require CPA security. Most traitor-tracing schemes in the literature are public-key, making
this distinction irrelevant. Here, we only need an encryption scheme that is secure for an a
priori bounded number of messages.
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• We allow the pirate decoder to be stateful, but in an unusual way. We require (roughly) that
if any of the queries are ciphertexts generated by Enc( ~sk, b), then the pirate decoder answers b
to those queries, regardless of the other queries issued. In many models, the pirate is allowed
to abort, and answer ⊥ if it detects that it is being traced. However, we do allow our pirate
to correlate its answers to different queries, subject to this accuracy constraint. We also allow
the pirate to see all the queries made by the tracer at once, which is more power than is
typically given to the pirate.
Roughly, the first three modifications will allow us to find a candidate scheme with very simple
decryption and the fourth modification will allow us to trace stateful pirates even in the setting of
bit-encryption.
3.2 Decryption Function Families
For Theorem 1.2, we are interested in traitor-tracing schemes where DecTT is a “simple” function
of the user key (for every ciphertext c ∈ C).
Definition 3.3 (Decryption Function Family). Let (GenTT,EncTT,DecTT) be a traitor-tracing
scheme where GenTT produces keys in {0, 1}κ and EncTT produce ciphertexts in C = C(κ). For
every c ∈ C, we define the c-decryption function qc : {0, 1}κ → {0, 1} to be qc(sk) = DecTT(sk, c).
We define the decryption function family Q(κ)DecTT = {qc}c∈C(κ) .
In what follows, we will say that ΠTT is an traitor-tracing scheme with decryption function
family Q(κ)DecTT .
4 Attacking Efficient Sanitizers
In this section we will prove our main result, showing that the existence of traitor-tracing schemes
(as in Definition 3.2) implies that efficient sanitizers cannot answer too many counting queries while
satisfying differential privacy.
Theorem 4.1 (Attacking Efficient Sanitizers). Assume that there exists an (n(κ), kTT(κ))-secure
traitor-tracing scheme ΠTT = (GenTT,EncTT,DecTT,TraceTT) with decryption function family Q(κ) =
Q(κ)DecTT. Then there does not exist any sanitizer M : ({0, 1}d)n × (Q(d))kTT(d) → RkTT(d) that is si-
multaneously 1) differentially private, 2) efficient, and 3) (Q, kTT(d))-accurate for Q = ∪d∈NQ(d).
In the typical setting of parameters, n(κ) = poly(κ), kTT(κ) = Θ˜(n
2), and decryption can be
implemented by circuits of size poly(n) = poly(κ). Then Theroem 4.1 will state that there is no
sanitizerM that takes a database D ∈ ({0, 1}d)poly(d), runs in poly(d) time, and accurately answers
Θ˜(n2) queries implemented by circuits of size poly(d), while satisfying differential privacy.
The main difference between Theorem 4.1 and the result of Dwork et al. [DNR+09] is that we
only assume the existence of a sanitizer for kTT(d) queries from Q(d) = Q(d)DecTT , whereas Dwork
et al. assume the existence of a one-shot sanitizer that answers every query in Q(d). To offset the
weaker assumption on the sanitizer, we assume that the traitor-tracing scheme is secure against
certain stateful pirate decoders (as in Definition 3.1) whereas Dwork et al. only need to trace
stateless pirates. Theorem 4.1 also explicitly allows the traitor-tracing scheme to have the relaxed
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functionality and security properties discussed at the end of Section 3, although it is implicit in
Dwork et al. that the relaxed properties are sufficient to prove hardness results.
We now sketch the proof: Every function qc ∈ Q(d) is viewed as a query qc(x) on a database
row x ∈ {0, 1}d. Assume there is an efficient sanitizer is that is (Q(d), kTT(d))-accurate for these
queries. The fact that M is accurate for these queries will imply that (after small modifications)
M is a kTT-available pirate decoder (Definition 3.1). Here is where we differ from Dwork et al.,
who assume that M accurately answers all queries in Q(d), in which case M can be viewed as a
stateless pirate decoder (but must solve a harder sanitization problem).
We complete the proof as in Dwork et al. Consider two experiments: In the first, we construct
an n-row database D by running GenTT(1
d) to obtain n user keys, and putting one in each row of
D. Then we run TraceTT on M(D, ·) and obtain a user i. Since M is useful, and ΠTT is secure,
we will have that i ∈ [n] with probability close to 1, and thus there is an i∗ ∈ [n] such that i = i∗
with probability & 1/n.
In the second experiment, we construct a database D′ exactly as in the first, however we exclude
the key sk(i
∗). Since D and D′ differ in only one row, differential privacy requires that TraceTT,
run with oracle M(D′, ·), still outputs i∗ with probability Ω(1/n). However, in this experiment,
i∗, sk(i∗) is no longer given to the pirate decoder, and thus security of ΠTT says that TraceTT, run
with this oracle, must output i∗ with probability o(1/n). Thus, we will obtain a contradiction.
Proof. Let ΠTT = (GenTT,EncTT,DecTT,TraceTT) be the assumed traitor-tracing scheme, and as-
sume there exists an efficient, differentially private, (Q(d), kTT(d))-accurate sanitizerM. We define
the pirate decoder PM as follows:
Algorithm 1 The pirate decoder PM
Input: A set of user keys ( ~skS) ∈ {0, 1}d and a set of ciphertexts c1, . . . , ckTT (kTT = kTT(d)).
Construct circuits specifying the queries qc1 , . . . , qckTT ∈ QDecTT,d.
Construct a database D = (sk(i))i∈S ∈ ({0, 1}d)|S|.
Let a1, . . . , akTT ←RM(D, qc1 , . . . , qckTT ).
Round the answers a1, . . . , akTT ∈ [0, 1] to obtain b̂1, . . . , b̂kTT ∈ {0, 1} (i.e. b̂j = dajc)
Output: b̂1, . . . , b̂kTT .
Since M is efficient, its running time is poly(d, n(d), kTT(d), |qc1 | + . . . + |qckTT |), which is
poly(d, n(d), kTT(d)). Recall that the size of the circuits (queries) qc ∈ Q(d)DecTT is poly(d, n). In
this case PM runs in time poly(d, n(d), kTT(d)) as well, since constructing the queries can be done
in time polynomial in their size, and the final rounding step can be done in time poly(kTT(d)).
Next, we claim that if M is accurate for Q(d), then PM is a useful pirate decoder.
Claim 4.2. If M is (QDecTT , kTT)-accurate, then PM is a kTT-useful pirate decoder.
Proof of Claim 4.2. Let ~sk ∈ {0, 1}d be a set of user keys for ΠTT and let S ⊆ [n] be a subset of
the users such that |S| ≥ n − 1. Suppose c ∈ C(d) and b ∈ {0, 1} are such that for every i ∈ S,
DecTT(sk
(i), c) = b. Then we have that, for D as in PM,
qc(D) =
1
|S|
∑
i∈S
qc(sk
(i)) =
1
|S|
∑
i∈S
DecTT(sk
(i), c) = b
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Let c1, . . . , ckTT be a set of ciphertexts, qc1 , . . . , qckTT and a1, . . . , akTT be as in PM. The accuracy
of M (with constant error α < 1/2) guarantees that
Pr
[∃j ∈ [kTT], ∣∣aj − fcj (D)∣∣ ≥ 1/2] = o(1/|S|2)
Since |S| ≥ n − 1, o(1/|S|2) = o(1/n2). Assuming a1, . . . , akTT is accurate up to error α < 1/2 for
qc1 , . . . , qckTT , aj will be rounded to exactly qcj whenever qcj (D) ∈ {0, 1}. That is,
Pr
 ∃j ∈ [kTT], b ∈ {0, 1}(∀i ∈ S,DecTT(sk(i), cj) = b) ∧ (b̂j 6= b)
 = o( 1
n(κ)2
)
Thus, PM is kTT-useful. This completes the proof of the claim.
Since PM is a kTT-useful pirate decoder, and ΠTT is a (n, kTT)-secure traitor-tracing scheme,
running TraceTT on PM will always return some user i ∈ [n]. Thus there must be some user i∗ that
TraceTT returns with probability & 1/n. Specifically, for every κ ∈ N, there exists i∗(κ) ∈ [n(κ)]
such that,
Pr
~sk←RGenTT(1κ)
PM’s, TraceTT’s coins
[
Trace
PM( ~sk,·)
TT (
~sk) = i∗(κ)
]
≥ 1
n(κ)
− o
(
1
n(κ)
)
. (1)
Let S(κ) = [n(κ)] \ {i∗(κ)} Now we claim that if M is differentially private, then TraceTT will
output i∗(κ) with significant probability, even PM is not given the key of user i∗(κ).
Claim 4.3. If M is differentially private (for ε = O(1), δ = o(1/n)), then
Pr
~sk←RGenTT(1κ)
PM’s, TraceTT’s coins
[
Trace
PM( ~sk,·)
TT (
~sk) = i∗(κ)
]
≥ Ω
(
1
n(κ)
)
.
Proof of Claim 4.3. Fix any κ and let kTT = kTT(κ) and i
∗ = i∗(κ), S = S(κ) as above. Let
D = ~sk and D−i∗ = ~skS . Take T to be the set of responses b̂1, . . . , b̂kTT such that TraceTT( ~sk),
after querying its oracle on ciphertexts c1, . . . , ckTT and receiving responses b̂1, . . . , b̂kTT , outputs i
∗
(T depends on the coins of GenTT and TraceTT). By differential privacy, we have that
Pr
[
M(D, qc1 , . . . , qckTT ) ∈ T
]
≤ eO(1) · Pr
[
M(D−i∗ , qc1 , . . . , qckTT ) ∈ T
]
+ o
(
1
n
)
.
Note that the queries constructed by PM depends only on c1, . . . , ckTT , not on ~skS . Also note that
the final rounding step does not depend on the input at all. Thus, for every T ⊆ {0, 1}kTT
Pr
[
PM( ~sk, c1, . . . , ckTT) ∈ T
]
≤ eO(1) · Pr
[
PM( ~skS , c1, . . . , ckTT) ∈ T
]
+ o
(
1
n
)
. (2)
The claim follows by combining with (1).
To complete the proof, notice that the probability in Claim 4.3 is exactly the probability that
TraceTT outputs the user i
∗, when given the oracle PM( ~skS), for S = [n] \ {i∗}. However, the
fact that PM is efficient, and ΠTT is a secure traitor-tracing scheme implies that this probability
is o(1/n). Thus we have obtained a contradiction. This completes the proof of the Theorem.
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5 Constructions of Traitor-Tracing Schemes
In this section we show how to construct traitor-tracing schemes that satisfy Definition 3.2, and
thus can be used to instantiate Theorem 4.1. First we will informally describe a simple construction
that requires the tracing algorithm to make a sub-optimal number of queries, but will hopefully give
the reader more intuition about the construction and how it differs from previous constructions of
traitor-tracing schemes. Then we will give precise definitions of the encryption schemes (Section 5.2)
and fingerprinting codes (Section 5.3) required for our construction. Then we will present the final
construction more formally (Section 5.4) and prove its security. Finally, we will use the weakened
security requirements of the encryption scheme to show that our traitor-tracing scheme can be
instantiated so that decryption is computable by constant-depth circuits (Section 5.6).
5.1 A Simple Construction
Our construction is a variant of the most basic tracing traitor-tracing scheme [CFN94]. Start with
any encryption scheme
(Gen,Enc,Dec). Generate an independent key sk(i) ←R Gen for each user (we will ignore the
security parameter in the informal description). To encrypt a bit b ∈ {0, 1}, we encrypt it under
each user’s key independently and concatenate the ciphertexts. That is
EncTT( ~sk, b) = (Enc(sk
(1), b), . . . ,Enc(sk(n), b)).
Clearly each user can decrypt the ciphertext by applying Dec, as long as she knows which part of
the ciphertext to decrypt.
Now we describe how an available pirate decoder for this scheme can be traced. As with all
traitor-tracing schemes, we will form ciphertexts that different users would decrypt differently,
assuming they decrypt as intended using the algorithm DecTT(sk
(i), ·). We can do so with the
following algorithm:
TrEncTT( ~sk, i) = (Enc(sk
(1), 1), . . . ,Enc(sk(i), 1),Enc(sk(i+1), 0), . . . ,Enc(sk(n), 0)
for i = 0, 1, . . . , n. The algorithm forms a ciphertext that users 1, . . . , i will decrypt to 0 and users
i+ 1, . . . , n will decrypt to 1.
The tracing algorithm generates a random sequence i1, . . . , ikTT ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, for kTT =
(n+ 1)s, such that each element of {0, 1, . . . , n} appears exactly s times, where s is a parameter to
be chosen later. Then, for every j it generates a ciphertext cj ←R TrEncTT( ~sk, ij). Next, it queries
P ~skS (c1, . . . , ckTT). Given the output of the pirate, the tracing algorithm computes
Pi =
1
s
∑
j:ij=i
P( ~sk, c1, . . . , ckTT)j
for i = 0, 1, . . . , n. Finally, the tracing algorithm outputs any i∗ such that Pi∗ − Pi∗−1 ≥ 1/n.
The tracing algorithm generates a random sequence of indices i1, . . . , ikTT ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, for
kTT = (n + 1)s, such that each element of {0, 1, . . . , n} appears exactly s times, where s is a
parameter to be chosen later. Then, for every j it generates a ciphertext cj ←R TrEncTT( ~sk, ij).
Next, it queries P ~skS (c1, . . . , ckTT). Given the output of the pirate, the tracing algorithm computes
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Pi =
1
s
∑
j:ij=i
P( ~sk, c1, . . . , ckTT)j for i = 0, 1, . . . , n. Finally, the tracing algorithm outputs any i∗
such that Pi∗ − Pi∗−1 ≥ 1/n.
Now we explain why this algorithm successfully traces efficient available pirate decoders. Notice
that if we choose c according to TrEncTT( ~sk, 0), then every user decrypts c to 0, so P0 = 0. Similarly,
Pn = 1. Thus, there exists i
∗ such that Pi∗−Pi∗−1 ≥ 1/n. Next, we argue that i∗ is in S except with
small probability. Notice that TrEncTT( ~sk, i
∗) and TrEncTT( ~sk, i∗ − 1) differ only in the message
encrypted under key sk(i
∗), so if i∗ 6∈ S, this key is unknown to the pirate decoder. The security of
the encryption scheme (made precise in Definition 5.2) guarantees that if sk(i
∗) is unknown to an
efficient pirate, then we can replace kTT uses of Enc(sk
(i∗), 1) with Enc(sk(i
∗), 0), and this change
will only affect the success probability of the pirate by o(1/n). But after we make this replacement,
TrEncTT( ~sk, i
∗) and TrEncTT( ~sk, i∗ − 1) are (perfectly, information-theoretically) indistinguishable
to the pirate. Since the sequence of indices i1, . . . , ikTT is random, the pirate has no information
about which elements ij are i
∗ and which are i∗ − 1. Thus, if the pirate wants to make Pi∗ larger
than Pi∗−1, for some i∗ 6∈ S, she can do no better than to “guess”. If we take s = O˜(n2), and apply
a Chernoff bound, it turns out that for every i 6∈ S, Pi−Pi−1 = o(1/n). This conclusion also holds
after we take into account the security loss of the encryption scheme, which is o(1/n). Thus, the
scheme we described is a secure traitor-tracing scheme in the sense of Definition 3.2.
In arguing that the scheme is secure, we used the fact that P0 = 0 and Pn = 1 no matter
what other queries are made to the pirate. In many applications, this assumption would not be
reasonable. However, when the pirate is derived from an accurate sanitizer, this condition will be
satisfied.
For this scheme, the tracer makes (n+ 1)s = O˜(n3) queries. Before proceeding, we will explain
how to reduce the number of queries from O˜(n3) to O˜(n2). The high-level argument that the
scheme is secure used two facts:
1. By the availability of the pirate decoder, if every user in S would decrypt a ciphertext c to b,
then the pirate decrypts c to b (in the above, P0 = 0, Pn = 1).
2. Because of the encryption, a pirate decoder without user i’s key “doesn’t know” how user i
would decrypt each ciphertext.
Systems leveraging these two properties to identify a colluding user are called fingerprinting
codes [BS98], and have been studied extensively. In fact, the tracing algorithm we described is
identical to the tracing algorithm we define in Section 5.4, but instantiated with the fingerprinting
code of Boneh and Shaw [BS98], which has length O˜(n3). Tardos [Tar08] constructed shorter
fingerprinting codes, with length O˜(n2), which we use to reduce the number of queries to trace.
Next we define the precise security requirement we need out of the underlying encryption scheme,
and then we will give a formal definition of fingerprinting codes.
5.2 Encryption Schemes
We will build our traitor-tracing scheme from a suitable encryption scheme. An encryption scheme
is tuple of efficient algorithms (Gen,Enc,Dec). All the algorithms may be randomized except for
Dec. The scheme has the following syntactic properties:
• The algorithm Gen takes a security parameter κ, runs in time poly(κ), and returns a private
key sk ∈ {0, 1}κ. Formally sk ←R Gen(1κ).
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• The algorithm Enc takes a private key and a message bit b ∈ {0, 1}, runs in time poly(κ),
and generates a ciphertext c ∈ C = C(κ). Formally, c←R Enc(sk, b).
• The algorithm Dec takes a private key sk ∈ {0, 1}κ and a ciphertext c ∈ C(κ), runs in time
poly(κ), and returns a message bit b̂.
First we define (perfectly) correct decryption6
Definition 5.1 (Correctness). An encryption scheme (Gen,Enc,Dec) is (perfectly) correct if for
every b ∈ {0, 1}, and every κ ∈ N,
Pr
sk←RGen(1κ)
[Dec(sk,Enc(sk, b)) = b] = 1.
We require that our schemes have the following kEnc-message security property.
Definition 5.2 (Security of Encryption). Let εEnc : N→ [0, 1] and kEnc : N→ N,TEnc : N×N→ N
be functions. An encryption scheme ΠEnc = (Gen,Enc,Dec) is (εEnc, kEnc,TEnc)-secure if for every
TEnc(κ, kEnc(κ))-time algorithm AEnc and every b = (b1, . . . , bkEnc), b′ = (b′1, . . . , b′kEnc) ∈ {0, 1} (for
kEnc = kEnc(κ)),∣∣∣∣∣ Prsk←RGen(1κ) [AEnc(Enc(sk, b1), . . . ,Enc(sk, bkEnc)) = 1]
− Pr
sk←RGen(1κ)
[AEnc(Enc(sk, b′1), . . . ,Enc(sk, b′kEnc)) = 1]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ εEnc(κ).
Notice that we do not require ΠEnc to be secure against adversaries that are given Enc(sk, ·) as
an oracle. That is, we do not require CPA security.
Definition 5.3 (Encryption Scheme). We say that a tuple of algorithms ΠEnc = (Gen,Enc,Dec) is
an (εEnc, kEnc,TEnc)-encryption scheme if it satisfies correctness and (εEnc, kEnc,TEnc)-security.
5.3 Fingerprinting Codes
As we alluded to above, our tracing algorithm will use a fingerprinting code, introduced by Boneh
and Shaw [BS98]. A fingerprinting code is a pair of efficient (possibly randomized) algorithms
(GenFP,TraceFP) with the following syntax.
• The algorithm GenFP takes a number of users n as input and outputs a codebook of n code-
words of length `FP = `FP(n), W = (w
(1), . . . , w(n)) ∈ {0, 1}`FP . Formally W ←R GenFP(1n).
We will think of W ∈ {0, 1}n×`FP as a matrix with each row containing a codeword.
• The algorithm TraceFP takes an n-user codebook W and a word w′ ∈ {0, 1}`FP and returns
an index i ∈ [n]. Formally, i = TraceFP(W,w′).
6It would not substantially affect our results if Dec were allowed to fail with negligible probability, however we
will assume perfect correctness for ease of presentation.
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Given a non-empty subset S ⊆ [n] and a set of codewords WS = (w(i))i∈S ∈ {0, 1}`FP , we define
the set of feasible codewords to be
F (WS) =
{
w′ ∈ {0, 1}`FP | ∀j ∈ [`FP] ∃i ∈ S w′j = w(i)j
}
.
Informally, if all users in S have a 0 (resp. 1) in the j-th symbol of their codeword, then they must
produce a word with 0 (resp. 1) as the j-th symbol. We also define the critical positions to be the
set of indices for which this constraint is binding. That is,
Crit(WS) =
{
j ∈ [`FP] | ∀i, i′ ∈ S w(i)j = w(i
′)
j
}
.
The security of a fingerprinting code asserts that an adversary who is given a subset WS of the
codewords should not be able to produce an element of F (WS) that does not trace to a user i ∈ S.
More formally,
Definition 5.4 (Secure Fingerprinting Code). Let εFP : N → [0, 1] and `FP : N → N be functions.
A pair of algorithms (GenFP,TraceFP) is an (εFP, `FP)-fingerprinting code if GenFP(1
n) outputs a
codebook W ∈ {0, 1}n×`FP(n), and furthermore, for every (possibly inefficient) algorithm AFP, and
every non-empty S ⊆ [n],
Pr
W←RGenFP(1n)
[AFP(WS) ∈ F (WS) ∧ TraceFP(W,AFP(WS)) 6∈ S] ≤ εFP(n)
where the two executions of AFP are understood to be the same.
Tardos [Tar08] gave a construction of fingerprinting codes of essentially optimal length, improv-
ing on the original construction of Boneh and Shaw [BS98].
Theorem 5.5 ([Tar08]). For every function εFP : N→ [0, 1], there exists an
(
εFP, O(n
2 log(n/εFP))
)
-
fingerprinting code. In particular, there exists a(
o(1/n2), O(n2 log n)
)
-fingerprinting code.
5.4 The Traitor-Tracing Scheme
We are now ready to state the construction more formally. The key generation, encryption, and
decryption algorithms are as we described in the sketch (Section 5.1), and stated below.
5.5 Security of ΠTT
In this section we will prove that out construction of ΠTT = (GenTT,EncTT,DecTT,TraceTT) is an
(n, `FP(n))-secure traitor-tracing scheme. It can be verified from the specification of the scheme
that it has the desired syntactic properties, that it generates n(κ) user keys, and that the tracing
algorithm makes `FP(n(κ)) non-adaptive queries to its oracle.
Now we show how an available pirate decoder for this scheme can be traced. As in the sketch
(Section 5.1), we want to generate a set of ciphertexts that different users decrypt in different ways.
Specifically, given a fingerprinting code W ∈ {0, 1}n×`FP (represented as a matrix with w(i) in the
i-th row), we want to generate a set of ciphertexts c1, . . . , c`FP , such that user i, if she decrypts as
intended using DecTT(sk
(i), ·), will decrypt cj to w(i)j . That is, DecTT(sk(i), cj) = w(i)j . TraceTT will
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Algorithm 2 The algorithms (GenTT,EncTT,DecTT) for ΠTT.
Let an encryption ΠEnc = (Gen,Enc,Dec) and a function n : N→ N be parameters of the scheme.
Assume that n(κ) ≤ 2κ/2 for every κ ∈ N
GenTT(1
κ) :
For every user i = 1, . . . , n(κ), let sk
(i) ←R Gen(1κ/2)
Let sk(i) = (sk
(i)
, i) (padded with zeros to have length exactly κ).
Output ~sk = (sk(1), . . . , sk(n))
(We will sometimes use sk(i) and sk
(i)
interchangeably)
EncTT(sk
(1), . . . , sk(n), b) :
For every user i, let c(i) ←R Enc(sk(i), b)
Output c = (c(1), . . . , c(n))
DecTT(sk
(i), c) :
Output b̂ = Dec(sk(i), c(i))
Algorithm 3 The algorithm TraceTT for ΠTT
The tracing algorithm for ΠTT and the subroutine TrEncTT. Let a length `FP = `FP(n) fingerprint-
ing code ΠFP = (GenFP,TraceFP) be a parameter of the scheme and let ΠEnc = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be
the encryption scheme used above.
TrEncTT(sk
(1), . . . , sk(n),W ):
Let n× k be the dimensions of W
For every i ∈ [n], j ∈ [k], let c(i)j ←R Enc(sk(i),Wi,j)
For every j ∈ [k], let cj = (c(1)j , . . . , c(n)j )
Output c1, . . . , ck
(Notice that Dec(sk(i), c
(i)
j ) = Wi,j)
TracePTT( ~sk):
Let n be the number of user keys and `FP = `FP(n)
Let W ←R GenFP(1n)
Let b̂1, . . . , b̂`FP ←R P(TrEncTT( ~sk,W )) and let w′ = b̂1‖ . . . ‖b̂`FP
Output i←R TraceFP(W,w′)
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query the pirate decoder on these ciphertexts, treat these responses as a word w′, run the tracing
algorithm for the fingerprinting code on w′, and use the output of TraceFP as its own output.
If P is available, its output will be a feasible codeword for WS . To see this, recall that if every
user i ∈ S decrypts cj to the same bit, then an available pirate decoder P( ~skS , ·), decrypts cj to
that bit. However, the critical positions of WS are exactly those for which every user i ∈ S has
the same symbol in position j. Thus, the codeword returned by the pirate is feasible, and the
fingerprinting code’s tracing algorithm can identify a user in S.
The catch in this argument is that TrEncTT takes all of W as input, however an attacker for
the fingerprinting code is only allowed to see WS , and thus cannot simulate TrEncTT in a security
reduction. However, if P only has keys ~skS , and i 6∈ S, then an efficient P cannot decrypt the
i-th component of a ciphertext c = (c(1), . . . , c(n)). But these are the only components that depend
on w(i). So w(i) is computationally hidden from P anyway, and we could replace that codeword
with a string of zeros without significantly affecting the success probability of P. Formalizing this
intuition will yield a valid attacker for the fingerprinting code, and obtain a contradiction.
Theorem 5.6 (From Encryption to Traitor-Tracing). Let ΠEnc be any
(εEnc, kEnc,TEnc)-secure encryption scheme, and ΠFP be a (εFP, `FP)-fingerprinting code, ΠFP. Let
n, kTT : N→ N be any functions such that for every κ ∈ N, n(κ) ≤ 2κ/2 and
1. the encryption scheme and fingerprinting code have sufficiently strong security,
n(κ) · εEnc(κ) + εFP(n(κ)) = o
(
1
n(κ)2
)
,
2. the encryption scheme is secure for sufficiently many queries,
kEnc(κ) ≥ kTT(κ) = `FP(n(κ)),
3. the encryption scheme is secure against adversaries whose running time is as long as the
pirate decoder’s, for every a > 0,
TEnc(κ/2, kTT(κ)) ≥ (κ+ n(κ) + kTT(κ))a.
Then ΠTT instantiated with ΠEnc and ΠFP is an (n, kTT)-traitor-tracing scheme.
Proof. Suppose there exists a poly(κ, n(κ), kTT(κ))-time pirate decoder P that violates the security
of ΠTT. That is, for every κ ∈ N, there exists S = S(κ) ⊆ [n(κ)], |S| ≥ n(κ)− 1, such that
Pr
~sk←RGenTT(1κ)
[
Trace
P( ~skS(κ),·)
TT (
~sk) 6∈ S
]
= Ω
(
1
n(κ)
)
where the probability is also taken over the coins of P and TraceTT. Since there are only n(κ) such
sets, for a randomly chosen i←R [n(κ)], we have
Pr
~sk←RGenTT(1κ)
i←R[n(κ)]
[
Trace
P( ~skS−i ,·)
TT (
~sk) 6∈ S
]
= Ω
(
1
n(κ)2
)
.
18
Both of these probabilities are also taken over the coins of P and TraceTT. We will show that such
a pirate decoder must either violate the security of the encryption scheme or violate the security
of the fingerprinting code.
Given a matrix W ∈ {0, 1}(n)×`FP(n), we define W−i ∈ {0, 1}(n−1)×`FP to be W with the i-th
codeword removed and W˜−i ∈ {0, 1}n×`FP(n) to be W with the i-th codeword replaced with ~0`FP(n).
We also use S−i as a shorthand for [n] \ {i}
Consider the following algorithm APFP
Algorithm 4 The fingerprinting security adversary.
APFP(S−i,W−i) :
Let n be the number of users for the fingerprinting code and κ be such that n(κ) = n
Generate keys ~sk ←R GenTT(1κ) and ciphertexts (c1, . . . , c`FP)←R TrEncTT( ~sk, W˜−i)
Output w′ = (̂b1, . . . , b̂`FP)←R P( ~sk−i, c1, . . . , c`FP)
(Note that W˜−i is just W−i with a row of zeros added, so the attacker is well-defined.)
Since the fingerprinting code is secure, for a randomly chosen i←R [n] (in fact, for every i ∈ [n]),
Pr
W←RGenFP(1n)
i←R[n]
[APFP(S−i,W−i) ∈ F (W−i) ∧ TraceFP(W,APFP(S−i,W−i)) = i] ≤ εFP(n) (3)
This condition could hold simply because AFP outputs an infeasible codeword with high probability,
not because we are successfully tracing a user in S. The next claim states that if P is an available
pirate decoder, then this is not the case.
Claim 5.7. Let kTT = kTT(κ) = `FP(n(κ)) for every κ ∈ N. If P is a kTT-available pirate decoder,
then for every κ ∈ N, every i ∈ [n(κ)], and every W ∈ {0, 1}n×`FP(n) (for n = n(κ))
Pr
[APFP(S−i,W−i) 6∈ F (W−i)] = o( 1n(κ)2
)
Proof of Claim 5.7. If P is kTT-useful, then, by definition, for every ~sk = (sk(1), . . . , sk(n)), every
i ⊆ [n], and every c1, . . . , ckTT , if every user i′ 6= i decrypts some cj to the same bit bj , then so does
P( ~sk−i, ·) (with high probability). That is, for b̂1, . . . , b̂kTT ←R P( ~sk−i, c1, . . . , ckTT),
Pr
[
∃j ∈ [kTT], b ∈ {0, 1}
((
∀i′ 6= i,DecTT(sk(i′), cj) = b
)
∧
(
b̂j 6= b
))]
= o
(
1
n(κ)2
)
(4)
Consider any critical position j ∈ Crit(W−i). These are the positions for which every user i′ 6= i
has the same bit w
(i′)
j = bj . It’s easy to see from the definition of TrEncTT (and the correctness of
ΠEnc) that if c1, . . . , ckTT ←R TrEncTT( ~sk, W˜−i) then every user i′ 6= i will decrypt cj to bj . Thus,
with probability close to 1, for every critical position j, the j-th output of P( ~sk−i, c1, . . . , ckTT) will
be equal to bj , which implies w
′ = (̂b1, . . . , b̂`FP) is feasible.
Since P outputs feasible codewords with high probability, we obtain
Pr
W←RGenFP(1n)
i←R[n]
[
TraceFP(W,APFP(S−i,W−i)) = i
] ≤ εFP(n(κ)) + o( 1
n(κ)2
)
(5)
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by combining the previous claim with (3).
There are only two differences between the success of the pirate decoder in fooling TraceTT and
the success of the fingerprinting adversary in fooling TraceFP (in the experiment described in (5)):
The first is that in the traitor-tracing security condition, P is given ~sk−i for a fixed i ∈ [n], whereas
the fingerprinting adversary is given W−i for a random i ←R [n]. This difference only affects the
error by a factor of n. That is, for every i ∈ [n]
Pr
[
Trace
P( ~sk−i,·)
TT (
~sk) = i
]
≤ n · Pr
i←R[n]
[
Trace
P( ~sk−i,·)
TT (
~sk) = i
]
The second difference is that in TraceTT, the ciphertexts given to the pirate are generated by
TrEncTT( ~sk,W ) whereas in AFP the ciphertexts are generated by
TrEncTT( ~sk, W˜−i). But these ciphertexts only differ in the i-th component, and sk(i) is unknown to
P, so this does not affect the behavior of the pirate decoder significantly. This fact is established
in the following claim.
Claim 5.8. If ΠEnc is (εEnc, kEnc,TEnc)-secure for kEnc,TEnc as in the statement of the Theorem,
then for every poly(κ, n(κ), kTT(κ)) pirate decoder P,∣∣∣∣∣ PrW←RGenFP(1n)
~sk←RGenTT,i←R[n]
[
TraceFP(W,P( ~sk−i,TrEncTT( ~sk,W ))) = i
]
− Pr
W←RGenFP(1n)
~sk←RGenTT,i←R[n]
[
TraceFP(W,P( ~sk−i,TrEncTT( ~sk, W˜−i))) = i
] ∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ εEnc(κ)
Proof of Claim 5.8. Let ΠEnc = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be the encryption scheme. The main observation
required to prove the claim is that the two experiments we want to relate can both be simulated
without sk(i), given challenges for the encryption scheme (Definition 5.2). Fix a codebook W ←R
GenFP(1
n). Now consider two distributions on ciphertexts (of ΠEnc): In either case, generate a
random key sk(i) ←R Gen(1κ)
• In the first case c(i)1 ←R Enc(sk(i), w(i)1 ), . . . , c(i)`FP ←R Enc(sk(i), w
(i)
`FP
)
• In the second case sk(i) ←R Gen(1κ) and c(i)1 ←R Enc(sk(i), 0), . . . , c(i)`FP ←R Enc(sk(i), 0)
Suppose we receive a set of `FP ciphertexts from one of these two distributions. Note that GenTT
chooses keys for each user independently, and TrEncTT generates ciphertext components for each
user independently. So we can generate keys ~sk−i, and ciphertext components for users other
than i independently, and use the challenge ciphertexts in place of the ciphertext components for
user i, without knowing sk(i). Suppose we simulate TrEncTT( ~sk,W ) in this way. Notice that if the
challenge ciphertexts come from the first distribution, then simulated ciphertexts will be distributed
exactly as in TrEncTT( ~sk,W ), and if the challenge ciphertexts come from the second distribution,
then the simulated ciphertexts will be distributed exactly as in TrEncTT( ~sk, W˜−i). But, if the claim
were false, then we would have found an adversary for the encryption scheme that can distinguish
between the two distributions with advantage greater than εEnc(κ). It is easy to see that if the pirate
decoder is efficient, then so will the adversary for the encryption scheme (since TraceFP,Gen,Enc
are all assumed to be efficient. We conclude that if the claim is false, then AEnc violates the security
of ΠEnc.
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We now complete the proof of the theorem by combining Equation (5) and Claim 5.8.
5.6 Decryption Function Family of ΠTT
Recall that the two goals of constructing a new traitor-tracing scheme were to trace stateful pirates
and to reduce the complexity of decryption. We addressed tracing of stateful pirates in the previous
section, and now we turn to the complexity of decryption. We do so by instantiating the traitor-
tracing scheme with various encryption schemes and making two observations: 1) The type of
encryption schemes we require are sufficiently weak that there already exist plausible candidates
with a very simple decryption operation, and 2) Decryption for the traitor-tracing scheme is not
much more complex than decryption for the underlying encryption scheme. We summarize the
second point with the following simple lemma.
Lemma 5.9 (Decryption Function Family for ΠTT). Let ΠTT be as defined, with ΠEnc as its
underlying encryption scheme. Let (sk, i) = sk ∈ {0, 1}κ and c = (c(1), . . . , c(n)) ∈ C(κ) be any user
key and ciphertext for ΠTT. Then
DecTT,c(sk) = DecTT,c(sk, i) =
∨
i′∈[n]
(
1i′(i) ∧ Decc(i′)(sk)
)
Here, the function 1x(y) takes the value 1 if y = x and 0 otherwise. The lemma follows directly
from the construction of DecTT. Also note that the function 1i′ : {0, 1}dlogne → {0, 1} is just a
conjunction of dlog ne bits (a single gate of fan-in O(log n)), and we need to compute n of these
functions. In addition to computing 1i′ and Decc(i′) , there are n conjunctions and a single outer
disjunction. Thus we add an additional n+ 1 gates, compute decryption n times, and increase the
depth by 2. Hence, an intuitive summary of the lemma is that if Dec can be implemented by circuits
of size s and depth h, DecTT can be implemented by circuits of size n · (s+O(log n)) = O˜(ns) and
depth h+ 2. This summary will be precise enough to state our main results.
By combining Lemma 5.9 with Theorem 5.6, we easily obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 5.10 (One-way Functions Imply Traitor-Tracing w/ Poly-Time Decryption). Let n =
n(κ) be any polynomial in κ. Assuming the existence of (non-uniformly secure) one-way functions,
there exists an (n, O˜(n2))-secure traitor-tracing scheme with decryption function family QDecTT,κ
consisting only of circuits of size poly(κ)
Proof. The existence of one-way functions implies the existence of an encryption scheme ΠEnc that
is (1/κa, κa, κa)-secure for every constant a > 0 and sufficiently large κ with decryption function
QDec,κ consisting only of circuits of size t(κ) = poly(κ) for every κ ∈ N. From Lemma 5.9, it is
easy to see that if ΠTT uses ΠEnc as its encryption scheme, then QDecTT,κ consists only of circuits
of size O˜(n(κ)t(κ/2)) = poly(κ).
Theorem 1.1 in the introduction follows by combining Theorem 4.1 with Corollary 5.10.
We will now consider the possibility of constructing a traitor-tracing scheme where the decryp-
tion functionality can be implemented by circuits of constant depth, and thus obtaining hardness
results for generic sanitizers that are efficient for constant-depth queries (Theorem 1.2). First,
we summarize our observation that the traitor-tracing scheme almost preserves the depth of the
decryption function.
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Corollary 5.11 (Encryption with Constant-Depth Decryption Impies Traitor-Tracing w/ Constan-
t-Depth Decryption). Let n = n(κ) be any polynomial in κ. If there exists an encryption scheme,
(Gen,Enc,Dec), that is (o(1/n2), ω(n4), na)-secure for every a > 0 and has decryption family Q(κ)Dec
consisting of circuits of size poly(κ) and depth h, then there exists a (n, O˜(n2))-secure traitor-
tracing scheme with decryption function family Q(κ)DecTT consisting of circuits of size O˜(n) · poly(κ)
and depth h+ 2.
The corollary is clear from Lemma 5.9 and Theorem 5.6.
The corollary is not interesting without an encryption scheme that can be decrypted by constant-
depth circuits. However, we observe that such a scheme (meeting our relaxed security criteria) can
be constructed from a sufficiently good local pseudorandom generator (PRG). A recent result of
Applebaum [App12] gave the first plausible candidate construction of a local PRG for the range of
parameters we need, giving plausibility to the assumption that such PRGs (and, as we show, traitor-
tracing schemes with constant-depth decryption) exist. We note that local PRGs actually imply
encryption schemes with local decryption, which is stronger than just constant-depth decryption.
Although it may be significantly easier to construct encryption schemes that only have constant-
depth decryption, we are not aware of any other ways of constructing such a scheme.
Definition 5.12 (Local Pseudorandom Generator). An efficient algorithm
G : {0, 1}κ → {0, 1}sPRG(κ) is a εPRG-pseudorandom generator if for every poly(sPRG(κ))-time ad-
versary APRG ∣∣Pr [APRG(G(Uκ)) = 1]− Pr [APRG(UsPRG(κ)) = 1]∣∣ ≤ εPRG(κ)
If, in addition, if each bit of the output depends only on some set of L bits of the input, then G is
a (εPRG, L)-local pseudorandom generator.
It is a well known result in Cryptography that pseudorandom generators imply encryption
schemes satisfying Definition 5.2 (for certain ranges of parameters). We will use a particular
construction whose decryption can be computed in constant-depth whenever the underlying PRG
is locally-computable (or, more generally, computable by constant-depth circuits). The construction
is the standard “computational one-time pad”, however we give a construction to verify that the
decryption can be computed by constant-depth circuits.
Algorithm 5 An encryption scheme ΠLocalEnc that can be decrypted in constant depth.
Gen(1κ) :
Let s←R {0, 1}κ and output sk = s
Enc(sk, b) :
Let r ←R {1, 2, . . . , sPRG(κ)} and output c = (r,G(sk)r ⊕ b)
Dec(sk, c) :
Let (r′, b′) = c and output: b = G(sk)r ⊕ b′
Lemma 5.13 (Local PRGs→ Encryption). If there exists a (εPRG(κ), L)-local pseudorandom gen-
erator G : {0, 1}κ → {0, 1}sPRG(κ), then there exists an (εEnc = εPRG + k2Enc/sPRG, kEnc)-Secure En-
cryption Scheme (Gen,Enc,Dec) with decryption function family QDec,κ consisting of circuits of size
poly(κ) and depth 4.
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Proof. The security follows from standard arguments: If we choose a random s ←R {0, 1}κ, then
G(s) is indistinguishable from uniform up to error εPRG. If we generate kEnc encryptions with key
s, and no two encryptions use the same choice of r, then the output is indistinguishable from
encryptions using uniform random bits in place of G(s). If we use uniform random bits in place of
G, then the message is information-theoretically hidden. The probability that no two encryptions
out of kEnc use the same choice of r is at most k
2
Enc/sPRG, so we lose this term in the security of
the encryption scheme.
Let 1i(j) be the indicator variable for the condition j = i. For every c = (r, b) ∈ C, we can write
Dec(r,b)(s) =
∨
i∈[sPRG(κ)]
(1i(r) ∧ (Gi(s)⊕ b)) .
Observe that, since Gi is a function of L bits of the input, it can be computed by a size-2
L DNF
(depth-2 circuit), thus Gi(s)⊕ b can be computed by a size 2L + 1, depth-3 circuit. The indicator
1i can be computed by a conjunction of dlog2 sPRG(κ)e bits, which is a size-dlog2 sPRG(κ)e, depth-1
circuit. The outer disjunction increases the depth by one level and the size by 1. Putting it all
together, we have shown that Decr,b(s) can be computed by depth-4 circuits of size O˜(2
LsPRG(κ)) =
poly(sPRG(κ)).
Combining Corollary 5.11 with Lemma 5.13 easily yields the following corollary.
Corollary 5.14 (Local Pseudorandom Generators Imply traitor-tracing w/ AC0 Decryption). Let
n = n(κ) be any polynomial in κ. Assuming the existence of a (o(1/n2), n7, L)-local pseudorandom
generator for some constant L ∈ N, there exists an (n, O˜(n2))-secure traitor-tracing scheme with
decryption function family QDecTT,κ consisting of circuits of size O˜(n) · poly(κ) and depth 6.
Theorem 1.2 in the introduction follows by combining Theorem 4.1 with Corollary 5.14.
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A Additional Related Work
In this appendix, we elaborate on the relationship between sanitizers, interactive sanitizers, and
one-shot sanitizers, and on the relationship between our results and prior work on the complexity
of differentially private sanitization.
The Relationship with [DNV12] Dwork, Naor, and Vadhan [DNV12] gave information the-
oretic lower bounds for stateless sanitizers. These are sanitizers that take k queries as input, but
whose answers to each query do not depend on the other k − 1 input queries.
Another interpretation of our results, which can be used to give an alternative proof of our
results, is that we construct a family of queries for which “keeping state doesn’t help”.
They consider a game where an n-row database is chosen at random, and a random subset of
n − 1 of those rows is given to the attacker. The attacker wants to violate privacy by recovering
the n-th row. To do so, the attacker chooses ∼ n2 queries (randomly, from a distribution that
depends on the n − 1 known rows) and requests answers to these queries. Using these answers,
they show that there is a particular way for the attacker to (randomly) guess the missing row, that
will succeed with sufficient probability to constitute a privacy violation. Their argument is in two
steps: 1) The expected correlation between the answers given by a stateless sanitizer and the value
of the queries on the missing row is significant. 2) A stateless sanitizer cannot give answers that
are correlated with too many rows that are not in the database. Combining these two steps shows
that the attacker has a significant chance of identifying the n-th row from its correlation with the
answers.
Typically, the intuition behind the analysis of traitor-tracing schemes follows roughly the same
two steps: 1) There will be some correlation between the decryptions returned by the efficient pirate
and the decryptions that would be returned by some member of the coalition (using only his own
key). 2) There will not be significant correlation between the decryptions returned by the efficient
pirate and the decryptions that would be returned by any user not a member of the coalition.
This is exactly the intuition we sketched in the simpler (sub-optimal) construction. In the final
construction, much of this argument is made “inside” the construction of the fingerprinting code.
If we “unrolled” the analysis of the fingerprinting code directly into our construction, we would
make exactly the same arguments.
Other Types of Sanitizers There are two other variants of sanitizers that have appeared in the
literature. The first, which we have already discussed, is a one-shot sanitizer. The second, is an
interactive sanitizer. This type of sanitizer is the same as the one we consider in this work, where
the sanitizer is given a database D and k queries from a family Q, but the queries arrive one at a
time, and may be chosen adaptively. In this setting, we want the sanitizer to answer each query
efficiently (in time polynomial in d, n, and k). The Laplace Mechanism is, in fact, interactive, and a
line of work initiated by Roth and Roughgarden [RR10, HR10, GRU12] showed how to interactively
answer 2O˜(n) queries in time poly(2d, n) per query.
The three variants we’ve described satisfy some interesting relationships. First, if we have an
algorithm that runs in time T and releases a summary that enables an analyst to answer any
query in Q in time T , then we also have an interactive sanitizer that runs in time 2T per query
that answers any sequence of k queries from Q. Secondly, if we have an interactive sanitizer that
answers up to K queries from Q in time T per query, then we also have a non-interactive sanitizer
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that answers any k ≤ K queries from Q in time Tk. Thus, holding Q fixed and assuming k  n2,
the problem we consider is the easiest form of private counting query release, and the lower bounds
we prove imply lower bounds for the other variants.
For the case of interactive sanitization, these lower bounds are new. To our knowledge, prior
to our work it was possible that there was an interactive sanitizer that ran in time poly(d, n) per
query and answered nearly 2n arbitrary counting queries, whereas our results show that there is no
efficient interactive sanitizer for significantly more than n2 queries. On the other hand, for counting
query release, our results only show that it is hard to release a particular family of queries Q whose
size is at least 2n. For families of queries this large, the results of Dinur and Nissim [DN03] already
imply the impossibility of release, even by computationally unbounded algorithms.
Indeed, in the data release problem one cannot take Q to include all efficiently computable
counting queries. Sanitizers (both interactive and non-interactive) are supposed to circumvent this
problem by allowing the queries to be arbitrary, but only answering the k queries that are needed.
However our results show that they can only circumvent the problem if we allow superpolynomial
computation or we take k . n2.
26
